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Mortgagee’s Failure to Take Reasonable Care to Sell at Market Value 
 
A recent decision of Stevenson J of the New South Wales Supreme Court provides a timely 
warning for Queensland mortgagees of their obligations when exercising power of sale.  The 
decision is Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Pola [2013] NSWSC 1801. 
Facts 
The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (‘the Bank’) was seeking possession of 
two rural properties in New South Wales owned by Mr Pola.  The Bank was also seeking 
judgment from Mr Pola for an amount in the order of $2.1 million.  Other than a cross-claim 
in which a set off was propounded, Mr Pola did not deny the Bank’s entitlement to the relief 
sought. 
The set off arose from a claim that Mr Pola and his wife made against the Bank arising out of 
the sale in 2010 by the Bank, as mortgagee exercising power of sale, of another rural 
property then owned by Mr and Mrs Pola in southern Queensland (‘the Property’).  Critically, 
the Property had the benefit of certain water rights including a water allocation that was 
capable of being traded separately from the Property.  Among other submissions, it was 
argued that the Bank had failed to discharge its obligations under s 85(1) of the Property 
Law Act 1974 (Qld).  Section 85(1) provides: 
It is the duty of a mortgagee, including as attorney for the mortgagor, or a receiver acting 
under a power delegated to the receiver by a mortgagee, in the exercise of a power of sale 
conferred by the instrument of mortgage or by this or any other Act, to take reasonable care 
to ensure that the property is sold at the market value. 
 
Submissions relevant to s 85(1) 
 
In relation to the alleged breach of s 85(1), it was submitted that the Bank failed in two 
respects to discharge its statutory duty.  Both submissions centred on the water rights 
enjoyed by the Property. 
 
The first submission related to the particular water allocation which was capable of being 
traded separately from the Property.  The submission made was that the Bank did not 
comply with the statutory duty by its failure to sell this water allocation separate to the land.  
Rather, the Bank elected to sell as an aggregation namely in-one-line. 
 
The second submission was based on the Bank’s omission, when advertising the Property 
for sale, to make any reference to the water rights associated with the property and, in 
particular, to the separate tradability of the particular water allocation referred to above.  
Although details of the Property’s water entitlements were referred to in an information 
memorandum prepared on behalf of the mortgagee these details did not appear in the 
advertising material. 
 
Relevantly, the advertisements were headed ‘Mortgagee Exercising Power of Sale’, referred 
to the Property as being irrigated and to ‘centuries of alluvial flows’ and gave details of the 
water storage capacity on the Property.  The advertisements also contained a picture of a 
crop under irrigation.  However, the advertisements did not mention the separately tradeable 
water allocation, nor a particular water licence (being a licence attached to the Property with 
significant inherent rights and benefits) or any other water entitlements associated with the 
Property. 
 
On behalf of the Bank it was said that it would be well known in the market place that an 
irrigated property would have water entitlements and that water allocation changes that had 
recently occurred would also be well known in the market.  It was also submitted on the 
Bank’s behalf that there was a danger of including too much information in any 
advertisements for the Property.  In this regard, the auctioneer of the property said in cross-
examination that he considered the knowledge of the water aspects of the property were well 
covered in a very broad brush approach in the advertisements.  Further, he considered that 
advertisements were to draw attention and enquiry, rather than provide complete information 
and that, in fact, the more information you put in an advertisement, generally speaking, the 
less response you would receive. 
 
Relevant Principles 
Stevenson J noted (at [233 and 234]) that it was common ground that, once a breach of s 85 
is established, it is not necessary to show a causal link between the particular breach and 
loss, and that at that point ‘the question [is] whether the sale price could be equated with the 
market value of the property’.  Provided it was established that a mortgagee failed to take a 
step that was reasonably necessary ‘to ensure’ market price was achieved, it was not 
necessary to prove that, as a matter of fact, the taking of that step would have ensured 
market price was achieved.  Nor was it necessary for the mortgagor to prove that some 
identifiable individuals would have offered to purchase, or actually purchased, the property 
for any particular price had there been no breach of the duty (citing Sablebrook Pty Ltd v 
Credit Union Australia Ltd [2008] QSC 242 at [149] per Applegarth J; Nixon v Commercial 
and General Acceptance Ltd [1980] Qd R 153 at 160 per Sheahan J; McKean v Maloney 
[1988] 1 Qd R 628 at 634–5 per McPherson J). 
By analogy to the case law under s 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which is in 
similar, although not precisely the same, terms as s 85, Stevenson J noted that where a 
property has attached to it assets or rights which are potentially valuable but not readily 
transferable, in order to discharge its duty, the mortgagee must consider and, if necessary, 
make enquiries and obtain advice on how the property or the benefit of the rights or assets 
might be passed on to a purchaser; and properly ascertain the market value of the property 
with and without those rights. 
A sale below the estimated market value does not of itself point to the conclusion that 
reasonable care to ensure the property sold at market value was not taken.  However, ‘if it is 
proved that the price obtained is substantially below the true value, that may be some 
evidence that proper steps were not taken’ (Stone v Farrow Mortgage Services (in liq) [1999] 
NSWCA 435 at [4], cited with approval in Stockl v Rigura Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 73 at [32]). 
 
Stevenson J went on to note (at [243]) that the vice in inadequate or defective advertising 
will not necessarily be cured by the fact that the mortgagee’s entire marketing process 
included additional information available from the agent that correctly disclosed the position.  
A potential buyer who was relevantly misled, and who would have had to make further 
enquiries in order to ascertain the correct position, may well have been dissuaded from 
doing so by the defective advertising. 
 
Result 
 
The Polas’ first submission, relating to the separate sale of the water allocation capable of 
being traded, was not successful.  Stevenson J held (at [309] and [310]) that had the Bank 
given further consideration to the separate sale of this particular water allocation, and sought 
the opinion of an expert in the water allocation market, it would have received advice that 
would have justified it in not pursuing the option further.  Thus, the failure by the Bank to take 
the course advocated on behalf of Mr and Mrs Pola would have made no difference to the 
ultimate marketing and sale approach taken by the Bank and did not amount to a breach by 
the Bank of its duty under s 85. 
The Polas’ second submission, based on the omission in the advertisements, was 
successful.  Stevenson J was prepared to concede (at [327]) that a reader of an 
advertisement considering the purchase of a very large and expensive farming property on 
which there is irrigation in all probability would assume the Property enjoyed water 
entitlements.  However, Stevenson J went on to opine (at [328]), that a prospective buyer, 
looking about in the market, considering a number of possibilities, and weighing up whether 
to consider purchasing the Property, rather than another property, may well have been 
tempted to investigate further, had details of the water entitlements featured in the 
advertisements.  Conversely, such a prospective buyer may well have been deterred or 
deflected from further consideration of the Property in the absence of those details. 
Stevenson further noted (at [329] and [330]) that Mr and Mrs Pola did not have to prove that, 
as a matter of fact, the absence of any reference to the water entitlements made any 
difference to any particular buyer.  All they needed to establish was that inclusion of such 
details was a step that ought reasonably to have been taken to ensure achievement of 
market value. 
Stevenson J considered that it was obvious that a step, or an act, that ought reasonably to 
have been done in this case in order to ensure that the Property sold at market value was to 
emphasise (amongst other things) its water entitlements.  As the Bank, through its agents, 
did not take this step, the Bank was in breach of its duty under s 85. 
Having found that the Bank had breached its duty under s 85, Stevenson J held that Mr and 
Mrs Pola were entitled to damages representing the difference between the price achieved 
following auction by the Bank ($6.1 million) and the market value of the Property.  The expert 
valuation evidence accepted by Stevenson J valued the property at the date the Bank 
entered the contract as being $7 million on an in-one-line basis. 
 
On this basis, Mr and Mrs Pola were held to be entitled to damages against the Bank for the 
difference of $900,000. 
 
Comment 
 
This decision reinforces an observation made elsewhere that the obligations of a mortgagee 
exercising power of sale in Queensland are process-based.1  A mortgagee who fails to 
advertise an important feature of the property offered for sale is likely, as in this instance, to 
have failed to take a necessary step to satisfy the statutory duty imposed by s 85 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld).  The fact that the information may be available elsewhere in a 
sales package or information memorandum may not be sufficient to excuse non-compliance.  
Once the statutory duty is found to have been breached, it is not necessary for the 
mortgagor to prove that the defective advertising made any difference to any particular 
buyer.  Once breach of the statutory duty is established, the measure of damages will be 
determined by a comparison of the price obtained with expert valuation evidence of the 
market value of the mortgaged property. 
 
                                                            
1 WD Duncan and WM Dixon, The Law of Real Property Mortgages, Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013, 276. 
Beyond its immediate application, this case also serves to call into question certain practices 
that seem to remain prevalent in the wider marketplace.  In this regard, it is not uncommon 
for a mortgagee, when exercising power of sale, to contract on an ‘as is where is’ basis and 
to evince the attitude that it is up to a potential buyer to find out about the mortgaged 
property and its attributes and features.  Consistent with this approach, mortgagees have 
traditionally been somewhat disinclined to undertake searches prior to exercising power of 
sale.  There is grave reason to question such an approach particularly where searches may 
reveal attractive attributes of the property that should be actively marketed.  As this decision 
clearly illustrates, a failure to market the property in an appropriate manner creates the 
potential for a significant claim for damages.  It is also worth noting that this type of damages 
claim is not restricted to the mortgagor but may be pursued by an affected guarantor as a 
‘person damnified by the breach’ within the meaning of s 85(3) of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld) as previously interpreted by the Queensland courts.2 
 
 
Dr Bill Dixon 
                                                            
2 See, eg, Higton Enterprises Pty Ltd v BFC Finance Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 168. 
